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ABSTRACT 
 
   Despite a documented decline in the number of dividend payers in the UK it is found 
that aggregate real dividends paid by industrials actually increased between 1979 and 
2000.  This  was  attributed  to  the  firms  lost  from  the  sample  being  generally  small 
distributors  of  dividends  whilst  the  growth  in  payments  by  large  firms  more  than 
compensated for the effect of the former. As a result a concentration of dividends has 
occurred consistent with that described in the US by DeAngelo et al (2002). During the 
same period it is also found that a concentration of earnings also occurred amongst the 
largest dividend payers. 
 
   There  was  found  to  be  an  increase  in  the  number  of  non-paying  firms  during 
recessionary periods consistent with previous work by Benito and Young (2001). An 
analysis of the listing status in 2000 of industrial dividend payers in 1979 shows that 
whilst only around one-fifth of these firms continued to pay dividends the vast majority 
of the remainder had been acquired and thus there is a good chance these dividends 
remain,  at  least  in  part,  in  larger  combined  entities.  4 
I. Introduction 
 
For  many  years  academic  researchers  have  been  analysing  the  dividend  policy  of 
publicly  quoted  firms  and  in  particular  the  proportion  of  earnings  distributed  to 
shareholders.  Miller  and  Modigliani  (1961)  show  that  in  an  environment  of  zero 
personal  taxes,  perfect  markets  and  given  borrowing  and  investment  decisions  that 
investors should be indifferent between receiving capital gains or dividends. 
 
In recent years a number of papers have documented a decline in the number of firms 
paying dividends. Fama and French (2001) describe how the proportion of US non-
utility,  non-financial  firms  paying  dividends  has  varied  between  53%  in  1973  to  a 
maximum of 67% in 1978 and then subsequently declined to just 21% as of 1999. They 
move to question whether the decline in payers is due to, a) there being less firms with 
the characteristics of dividend payers, b) a decline in the propensity to pay dividends by 
firms with the same characteristics, or c) a combination of the two. They found that 
dividend  payers  were  larger  in  size,  more  profitable  but  with  less  investment 
opportunities  than  their  non-paying  counterparts.  There  had  been  a  decline  in  the 
number of firms possessing these characteristics but this alone failed to explain the drop 
in dividend payers. After controlling for the change in characteristics it was found there 
was still a shortfall of 20% between the firms that were expected to pay and those that 
actually did. Thus a decline in the propensity to pay was also found. 
 
DeAngelo et al (2002) report similar findings to Fama and French, also finding a decline 
in industrial firms that pay dividends though in addition they also consider the level of 
aggregate  dividends  distributed  by  industrials.  This  actually  increased  in  real  terms   5 
between  1978  and  2000.  They  explain  the  apparent  difference  between  a  rise  in 
aggregate payments yet a fall in the number of payers as being consistent with the loss 
of many small payers from the sample combined with real increases in dividends by 
large payers, with the large payer effect completely dominating the number of payers at 
the  aggregate  level.  Overall,  DeAngelo  et  al  (2002)  find  little  evidence  of  any 
fundamental change in the payout ratio over the period of study among dividend paying 
industrials. 
 
Recent UK evidence by Benito and Young (2001) provides an interesting comparison 
with the US studies. They discover the proportion of quoted non-financial firms not 
paying dividends increases significantly during periods of recession. In 1979 over 95% 
of firms paid a dividend but this fell to troughs of 84% in 1982, 83% in 1993 and 75% in 
1999. An estimate for the number of payers expected in 1999, based on parameters prior 
to  1994,  was  for  83%.  Thus  again  a  decline  in  propensity  to  pay  dividends  was 
discovered  albeit  not  of  the  same  magnitude  as  the  US  evidence.  The  much  higher 
overall proportions of dividend payers also suggested that a culture of dividends is much 
more deeply engrained in the UK than the US. 
 
Ferris  et  al  (2003)  study  a  sample  of  UK  firms  excluding  financials,  utilities  and 
partially government-owned firms between 1990 and 2001. Over this period they report 
a decline in dividend payers from 71% to 54%, with the proportion of new lists paying 
dividends having fallen from 50% to just 7%. Dividend payers are found to be larger and 
more profitable than non-payers but, conversely to the US evidence, also possessing 
greater investment opportunities. After controlling for these characteristics, confirmation 
of a declining propensity to pay is found. This remained present after accounting for the   6 
effects of share repurchases being a substitute for dividend payments. When Ferris et al 
(2003) applied an aggregate dividend approach similar to DeAngelo et al (2002) they 
found a 6% increase in real dividends between 1990 and 2001. This was accompanied 
by an increase in the concentration of dividends amongst the largest payers, especially 
among those firms distributing over £500m annually. 
 
This paper builds on previous work carried out on aggregate dividend payments in the 
UK. By using a period of data between 1979 and 2000 it provides a very similar epoch 
to that utilized by DeAngelo et al (2002) from which to draw comparisons. Furthermore, 
by using annual data in many situations, it is hoped additional conclusions can be drawn 
compared to the ‘snapshot’ approach that has been used in much of the work up to now 
where conclusions are drawn from just two annual periods, one at the start and one at the 
end. With a data period of over twenty years it is anticipated that there may be many 
relationships that have not behaved linearly as could be interpreted from essentially just 
two data points. It is argued that a snapshot approach can, in some instances, be both 
misleading and unnecessary. 
 
By also considering earnings over the period in question, this study investigates whether 
a concentration of earnings has occurred in dividend payers similar to the findings in the 
US reported by DeAngelo et al (2002). Ferris et al (2003) find an increasing proportion 
of aggregate earnings accountable to relatively few large firms in the UK between 1990-
2001. This paper extends this by considering the longer time frame of 1979-2000 and 
analysing each individual annual period. 
   7 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the tax system 
in operation in the UK during the period of study, the implications of the Finance Act 
1999 and the abolition of dividend controls in 1979. Section III describes the data and 
methodology employed in this study. In Section IV results are reported on, amongst 
others, the concentration of dividends and earnings and the listing status in 2000 of 
dividend payers in 1979. Section V concludes. 
 
II. Dividend Taxation and Legislation in the UK 
 
Since April 1973 the UK has operated an imputation system of taxation in one form or 
another. Under this system companies pay a net dividend to shareholders and an amount 
equal to the gross dividend multiplied by the rate of imputation to the Inland Revenue. 
The rate of imputation has always been equal to the basic rate of tax on dividends. The 
tax paid on the dividend is also treated as a payment in advance of the firm’s corporation 
tax.  If  the  firm  has  sufficient  taxable  profits  then  corporation  tax  is  paid  on  the 
remainder. The amount of advance corporation tax (ACT) that can be offset is limited to 
the due amount if a firm chose to pay all taxable profits as a gross dividend. Furthermore 
only UK earnings can be offset against ACT; thus firms with large profitable overseas 
subsidiaries may find that dividends do not carry the full ACT credit or indeed any 
credit at all. 
 
Under the imputation system, with the basic rate of tax on dividends set, for example, at 
20%, a net £80 dividend would have a ‘grossed up’ value of £80 ´ (1 / 0.8) = £100. Thus 
a basic rate taxpayer would receive an £80 dividend with no further tax to pay and the 
Inland Revenue would receive £20 that counts as the firm’s ACT payment. A higher rate   8 
taxpayer (at 40% on dividends) would have to pay an additional £20 in tax whilst tax-
exempt  investors,  prior  to  July  1997,  could  reclaim  the  £20  ACT  from  the  Inland 
Revenue and thus receive the full £100 gross dividend. 
 
As of 2
nd July 1997 things became more complicated. Pension funds and institutions 
were no longer allowed to reclaim the ACT payment that their tax-exempt status had 
until that point granted them. Thus if a net dividend of £80 was paid, they received just 
£80.  Tax-exempt  individual  investors  were  still  able  to  reclaim  the  tax  and  thus 
continued to receive the full £100. 
 
On 6
th April 1999 the Finance Act was introduced. This meant that tax-exempt investors 
were no longer able to reclaim the tax paid on their behalf (unless it was sheltered in a 
PEP or ISA where it can be reclaimed until April 2004). At the same time the ACT rate 
was reduced, along with the basic rate of tax on dividends, from 20% to 10%. The 
higher rate of tax on dividends was cut from 40% to 32.5%. The result of these changes 
was that for the £80 net dividend used as an example previously, tax-exempt individual 
investors now only received £80. Basic-rate payers also received £80, with higher band 
payers receiving £80 ´ (1 / 0.9) ´ 0.675 = £60. Thus basic and higher rate payers were 




Dividend controls were in existence in the UK intermittently between August 1966 and 
December 1969 and then again from December 1972 through to July 1979 inclusive. 
The  desired  effect  of  these  controls  was  to  limit  the  rate  at  which  dividends  were   9 
allowed to grow. This was consistent with policy during this era that placed restrictions 
on increases in earned income. The permitted growth rates varied between zero and 
3.5% during the 1960s and a typical 10% during the 1970s (for exceptions to these 
levels see Hansen and Goudie (1988)). Whilst only a small period of this study comes 
under  the  ‘umbrella’  of  dividend  controls  (the  first  few  months  of  1979)  it  seems 
plausible that the effects may permeate for some years afterwards as payouts gradually 
revert to ‘normal’ levels. 
 
Hansen and Goudie (1988) provide a full description of the implementation of dividend 
controls in the UK. They find the observance of the control legislation declined over 
time with distributions by over 50% of firms exceeding the allowable limits. Most of 
these excessive payouts were found to be only slightly above the legal requirements 
though. It was also discovered that virtually all the largest one hundred firms remained 
within the set limits. The firms that were most affected by the controls were a small 
group of firms with relatively high payouts. 
 
Chui et al (1992) argue that dividend controls could cause payout ratios to either rise or 
fall. The controls could suppress payouts if the allowable growth rate is set very low, or 
alternatively  the  growth  rate  may  be  set  above  the  usual  growth  rate  for  firms  and 
managers view the rate as the norm and try to keep pace with it, thus increasing their 
payouts.  However,  findings  reported  by  Poterba  (1984)  describe  that  payouts  were 
reduced on aggregate by as much as 50% during 1972-79. Overall, Chui et al (1992) 
find no evidence of adjustments in the equilibrium rates of return during periods of 
dividend control. 
   10 
Dividend  controls  were  also  present  in  the  US  for  a  short  period  during  the  Nixon 
administration.  Baker  and  Wurgler  (2003)  describe  how  between  August  1971  to 
December 1971 dividends were frozen as an attempt to control inflation. From January 
1972 through April 1974 guidelines remained in place that limited dividend growth to 
four percent based on the maximum payout over the preceding three years. Thus if a 
firm  had  not  made  a  distribution  during  this  time  it  would  be  unable  to  initiate  a 
dividend. Whilst the dividend controls were only ‘guidelines’ there was found to be a 
high level of compliance. Baker and Wurgler (2003) found these controls had a high 
degree of success with the propensity to pay dividends remaining in decline despite their 
framework based around firms catering for investors dividend preferences at the time 
pointing to a higher propensity to pay. After the controls were lifted the propensity to 
pay realigned itself with the catering theory, as it was prior to the introduction of the 
controls. 
 
III. Data & Methodology 
 
Throughout this study, consistent with Fama and French (2001) and DeAngelo et al 
(2002),  only  industrial  firms  will  be  included.  The  industrial  classification  excludes 
firms  with  SIC  codes  between  4900-4949  and  6000-6999.  Thus  sectors  outside  the 
sample,  amongst  others,  are  banks,  insurers,  brokers,  other  financials,  property, 
investment trusts and utilities. Of these firms the financials are excluded to avoid any 
instances  of  ‘double  counting’,  whilst  the  utilities  are  excluded  lest  there  be  any 
regulatory issues that may distort the results. For the purposes of readability the words 
‘firm’ and ‘company’ have been used as substitutes for ‘industrial’ intermittently. 
   11 
Data is utilised from the London Share Price Database (LSPD) between the end of 1979 
and the end of 2000. This choice is jointly motivated by a desire to be aligned as closely 
as possible to previous studies for comparative purposes and also that sufficient data is 
not available from the LSPD before 1979. Throughout this study two different types of 
method  will  be  used  to  present  findings.  The  first  is  the  ‘snapshot’  method  that  is 
extensively used by DeAngelo et al (2002) and Ferris et al (2003). Two annual periods 
are selected, one at the beginning of the sample and one at the end (i.e. 1979 and 2000), 
and  are  compared  to  reflect  changes  over  the  period.  The  second  approach  is  the 
‘annual’  method  whereby  figures  will  be  reported  for  both  years  in  the  ‘snapshot’ 
approach  but  also  all  intermediate  years  as  well  (i.e.  all  years  from  1979  to  2000 
inclusive). This should enable any potentially misleading conclusions drawn from the 
first method to be highlighted. 
 
In most cases figures will be reported for all industrials, although in situations where 
only two years are reported results are often provided both inclusive and exclusive of 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) companies. The reasoning behind this is that in 
1979 no such ‘fledging’ market like AIM, or its predecessor, the Unlisted Securities 
Market (USM), existed. Therefore, companies that opted for an AIM listing in 2000 
would have had to either apply for a full listing in 1979 or remain part of the private 
sector. The provision of two sets of results allows for these different possibilities. All 
figures from 1982 onwards include the ‘unquoted’ sector unless explicitly stated. In 
contrast to Ferris et al (2003), there is no minimum size of firm for inclusion in the 
sample and all foreign firms are excluded. A minimum qualification period of listing of 
twelve months is implemented to ensure complete data exists for all firms under study.   12 
Finally, where there is evidence of missing data the relevant firms have been excluded 
from the sample. 
 
In the previous section the Finance Act 1999 was described along with the implications 
for investors across all taxation bands. After the implementation of this legislation it 
became common practice for dividends to be reported as net values since no investor 
actually  received  the  ‘grossed  up’  dividend  any  more.  Prior  to  this  dividends  were 
reported gross. The implications of this extend to this study. All years prior to 1999 have 
values recorded as gross and gross only. In the years 1999 and 2000 figures for both 
gross and net dividends are displayed except where there is no appreciable difference. 
This is necessary since reporting gross values only seems unreasonable given that no 
investors actually received the gross amount. On the other hand, a basic-rate payer is no 
worse off prior to the reform so it also appears unreasonable to penalise the aggregate 
payout from their point of view by just reporting net figures. All gross values are thus 
reported inclusive of a tax credit equal to 10% of the gross dividend in 1999 and 2000 
unless it was found these credits did not exist. 
 
Whilst  the  possibility  exists  of  some  dividends  being  paid  in  1999  prior  to  the  tax 
changes in April at the higher ACT rate of 20%, by assuming the 10% credit for all it 
provides a fair comparative throughout the year. Without this a firm could be regarded 
as  a  larger  payer  than  another  simply  because  of  the  timing  of its  payment.  It  also 
provides a better comparison between 1999 and 2000. 
 
Throughout this paper many references are made to real values. These have always been 
based to 1979 price levels using the Retail Price Index (RPI). For example, in December   13 
1979 this index stood at 240.48 and by December 2000 it had risen to 682.39. Thus all 
real values in 2000 have been calculated as the nominal value multiplied by the ratio of 
the 1979 RPI to the 2000 RPI (i.e. 240.48 ¸ 682.39). 
 
This  study  focuses  only  on  dividends  as  the  method  of  distributing  payments  to 
shareholders, providing a like-for-like comparison with DeAngelo et al (2002). Share 
repurchases, which were first made legal in the UK in the Companies Act 1981, are not 
considered. Rau and Vermaelen (2002) find that share repurchases are far less common 
in the UK than the US, partly due to regulatory provisions making them less attractive. 
During a period between 1985-98 they find only 264 qualifying repurchases announced 
by firms. Ferris et al (2003) also document low levels of share repurchases in the UK 
market between 1990-2001. They find this does not explain the decline in the number of 
firms paying dividends. 
 




Table 1 shows summary statistics of dividend payments by UK industrial firms in 1979 
and 2000. Firstly, row (1) describes the number of listed industrials in the UK. There are 
only approximately three-quarters of the number of firms quoted on the main market in 
2000 compared with 1979. There is much less of a decline though when the 2000 figures 
inclusive  of  AIM  firms  are  related  to  1979,  suggesting  AIM  may  have  become  a 
substitute for a main listing. Rows (2) and (3) show there has been a decline in both the 
number of dividend paying industrials and the proportion of all industrials that they   14 
make up. In 1979, 94.1% of the sample firms were dividend payers but by 2000 this had 
fallen to 74.2% with a main listing, and 66.9% when firms from AIM were included. 
This compares with Benito and Young (2001) who found that in 1999, 74.8% of UK 
non-financials were dividend payers. The contrast with US evidence presented by Fama 
and French (2001) is very marked. They find that in 1978, 66.5% of non-financial, non-
utility firms paid dividends but by 1999 this was just 20.8%. 
 
Rows (4) and (5) describe  the  increase in the total dividend  payment by industrials 
between  1979  and  2000.  Despite  the  decline  in  both  the  number  and  proportion  of 
payers, there have been considerable increases in dividends in both nominal and real 
terms. The 136.5% (or 162.7% using gross values) increase in real dividends from 1979 
to 2000 is despite there being 40% fewer paying firms. This resulted in the mean real 
dividend rising from £2.94m to £11.84m (£13.15m) on the main market, and £10.48m 
(£11.64m)  when  AIM  is  included.  Row  (7)  shows  the  increase  in  the  median  real 
dividend  per  dividend  paying  firm.  This  has  grown  but  not  as  rapidly  as  the  mean 
dividend. In 1979, there was already evidence of a concentration of dividends among 
few  firms  given  the  difference  between  the  mean  and  the  median.  The  expanding 
difference  discovered  in  2000  is consistent  with  a  greater concentration  of  dividend 
amongst relatively few large payers. This evidence supports findings by DeAngelo et al 
(2002) who notice a considerable concentration in dividends in the US market. 
 
When results inclusive of AIM are compared to those  of just  the  main market  it  is 
noticeable there are an additional 93 dividend payers. Despite the inclusion of these, 
Row (3) shows the proportion of dividend payers is lower. This is consistent with AIM 
listings being fledgling companies and thus less likely to pay dividends compared to   15 
more established firms. A glance at the total real dividends shows that these additional 
93 payers only contribute a net £16m to the total payment. This is tiny when compared 
to the £8,369m distributed by the main market. The implications of using gross values 
for 2000 are small in terms of the overall conclusions; the difference is the increased 
percentage change on 1979 compared to the net figures. 
 
Table  2  provides  annual  summary  statistics  of  industrial  dividend  payments.  The 
potential for different conclusions on the trend of dividend paying industrials depending 
on the base year chosen in the snapshot method is clearly visible. For example, between 
1979 and 2000 there was a decline of 402 dividend payers but between 1980 and 1997 
there was actually an increase of some 67 payers. Thus two relatively closely aligned 
snapshot  studies could produce very different  results if there is a big change in the 
studied variable around either of the chosen years and this must be borne in mind when 
considering previous results. The proportion of firms paying dividends can be seen to 
vary across the annual data but a particularly large decline occurred between 1997 and 
2000 as the ‘dot-com boom’ took hold. Over the whole period the mean and median 
dividend variables increase more steadily, reaching their peaks in 2000. Throughout all 
periods  the  skewness  in  the  dividend  distribution  continues  as  evidenced  by  the 
persistent differences between mean and median. 
 
The Concentration of Dividend Payments between 1979 and 2000 
 
Table 3 shows industrial firms ranked according to the size of their dividend payments 
using a snapshot approach comparable in type with DeAngelo et al (2002) and Ferris et 
al (2003). The first row displays aggregate figures for the largest one-hundred dividend   16 
payers, the second row shows the second hundred largest dividend payers, and so on. 
Looking first at the 1979 results, there is clear evidence of a skewed distribution, with 
nearly three-quarters of all dividends being paid by the largest 100 payers. The largest 
300 firms, approximately one-quarter of industrial firms, account for over 90% of all 
dividends. 
 
In 2000 the evidence points to an increasing concentration of dividends. The largest 100 
payers distributed 88% of the total dividend payment, whilst the top 300 paid over 97% 
of all dividends. In all ranking groups, apart from the largest 100, the proportion of the 
total dividend payment attributable to these groups has fallen. As further evidence of the 
growth in these large payers, the largest 100 in 2000 paid more than twice the total 
dividends by all industrials in 1979 in real terms. These findings are consistent with 
DeAngelo  et  al  (2002)  who  found  a  decline  in  the  proportion  of  the  total  market 
payment by smaller payers. The top 100 firms in their US study accounted for 81% of 
all  dividends  in 2000. It would appear the UK has an even higher concentration  of 
dividends amongst large industrial payers than the US on this basis. The choice of gross 
or net values for 2000 has no impact on the percentage of dividends attributable to each 
group. Gross values do increase the comparative difference between the real values of 
dividends in 1979 and those in 2000. 
 
Annual  data  showing  the  percentages  of  dividends  paid  by  each  ranking  group  is 
displayed in Table 4. There is a steady increase in the proportion of dividends that the 
Top 100 are responsible for. All other groups are in virtually constant decline from their 
highs in 1979 to the lows of 2000. The findings of increased concentration from 1990 
onwards are consistent with those of Ferris et al (2003). They find a comparatively   17 
lower concentration in 1990 however; this is probably due to the rules for inclusion of 
stocks in the samples. The main differences are they adopt all new listings, no firms are 
included under $100m and foreign stocks are accepted whereas this study requires a 
one-year qualification period, there is no market capitalization restriction and foreign 
stocks are omitted. 
 
Table 5 provides a cross-sectional snapshot view of real dividend payments in 1979 and 
2000.  Nine  different  classifications  have  been  formed  with  each  dividend  paying 
industrial  allocated  to  one  group  only.  The  left-hand  side  of  the  table  provides  a 
description of the number of firms in each category while the opposite side reports the 
real amount of dividends these account for. 
 
In 1979 there were very  few firms  in the largest dividend  categories. Over  88%  of 
dividend paying industrials distributed less than £5m, and 97.5% paid less than £20m. 
However, by 2000 there had been an increase in the number of payers in all of the five 
largest categories, and six of the largest seven in net terms. This was in spite of a 41% 
fall  in  the  number  of  payers.  The  biggest  decline  came  in  the  group  paying  real 
dividends less than £1m; main market payers fell by 60%, from 847 to 340 firms. It is 
this category where the inclusion of AIM stocks is the most notable. Of the 93 dividend 
payers  on  AIM,  91  of  these  paid  real  dividends  of  less  than  £1m.  Even  after  this 
inclusion  there  is  still  a  large  decline  in  the  number  of  industrials  in  the  smallest 
dividend  category.  Similar  findings  are  reported  by  DeAngelo  et  al  (2002)  for  US 
industrials, with a decline of 60% between 1978-2000 in terms of the number of firms 
distributing less than $100m in real terms. The number of firms paying $100m or greater 
increased by 79% over the same period.   18 
 
The  total  amount  of  dividends  attributable  to  each  category  merely  reinforces  the 
conclusion of increased dividend concentration described earlier. From 1979 to 2000 
(net) the total real dividends distributed by firms with real dividends in excess of £100m 
increased more than five-fold. There were also significant increases for the other large 
dividend categories. The category that saw the largest decline was industrials paying 
dividends less than £1m, however the larger payers dwarf this group in terms of total 
payment size. In 2000 these firms, including AIM stocks, paid an aggregate of £142.9m 
on a net basis compared to £4,409.4m by the firms with dividends greater than £100m. 
Indeed there is the remarkable finding that the 13 firms in this largest category paid 
more in real terms than all of the quoted industrials in 1979. 
 
Tables 6 and 7 show how the number of firms and the real amounts they distribute varies 
annually. Whilst there have been a significant increase in the number of firms in the 
larger  groups  in  2000  compared  to  1979,  there  have  been  relatively  minor  changes 
compared to the late 1980s and early 1990s. For example, in 1991 there were 36 firms 
with dividends in excess of £50m but only 37 paid over £50m, using gross amounts, in 
2000.  The  real  amounts  by  the  former  though  were  equal  to  £5,170m  compared  to 
£6,719m by the latter. Thus the large payers have continued to increase in size over the 
last ten years of the sample but this has not been accompanied by increasing numbers of 
firms. During this period many of the small and medium payers were lost from the 
market. These findings are consistent with Ferris et al (2003). 
 
The changes described in dividend payments in both the US and UK in the final twenty 
or so years of the last century have been very considerable. Given the magnitude of the   19 
change it seems reasonable to examine whether the issue of taxation has been a major 
cause of this shift in dividend behaviour. Morgan and Thomas (1998) describe how 
historically dividends have always been taxed more heavily in the US relative to capital 
gains than in the UK. Given that capital gains tax is only levied in both countries when 
the gain is realised, this in effect amounts to a loan from the government compared to 
dividend taxation. In this situation there is a ‘traditional’ argument that it is most tax-
efficient for companies to retain post-tax earnings within the firm rather than distribute 
cash payments to shareholders. Alternatively, firms could buy in their own shares that 
hopefully gives rise to capital gains in the longer-term. Some investors are attracted to 
regular cash payments, however, despite the unfavourable tax treatment. It may be they 
have  ongoing  liabilities  and  that  dividend  payments  help  in  meeting  these.  If  no 
investors  desired  dividends  it  would  be  hard  to  believe  that  companies  would  keep 
delivering them. 
 
Elton and Gruber (1970) and Auerbach (1979) put forward an alternative view to the 
argument detailed above. They argue that, provided dividends are the ultimate form of 
cash payment to shareholders, it is the eventual taxation of dividends that is capitalized 
into the firms share price rather than the current yield of the security. Firms are thus 
unable to add/destroy value by paying dividends as opposed to turning earnings into 
capital gains, which are treated as deferred dividends. Value is added by the undertaking 
of projects with a positive net present value. 
 
The fact that so few industrials paid dividends in the US in 2000 does appear consistent 
with the punitive tax policy, however total real dividend payments were increasing at 
this time, which contradicts the falling number of payers. From the start of this study in   20 
1979 until 1997, the UK did not penalise dividend income in the same way as the US. 
According  to Chui  et al. (1992), the imputation system at the  time made  basic  rate 
taxpayers  prefer  dividends  since  the  income  tax  was  already  included  in  the  ACT 
payment and retentions of earnings would give rise to capital gains and a subsequent 
CGT bill. 
 
Whilst the decline in the number of industrial payers appear to coincide with the changes 
to the tax system, Benito and Young (2001) show that there had been a steady decline in 
the proportion of UK non-financials paying dividends since at least the beginning of the 
last decade of the century rather than a sharp drop around the time of policy change. 
Once  again,  the  large  increase  in  total  dividend  payment  does  not  agree  with  a 
traditional theory based on dividend changes surrounding taxation changes. This concurs 
with  previous  work  on  the  UK  market  by  Morgan  and  Thomas  (1998)  who  found 
evidence among dividend payers of higher risk-adjusted returns to higher yielding stocks 
after controlling  for size.  This is  the  reverse of  what would  be expected during the 
period of their study given a smaller proportion of the total return was a capital gain. 
Christie  (1990)  found  a  similar  relationship  in  the  US.  However,  in  the  US  this  is 
consistent with a tax-based explanation since the higher pre-tax returns on firms that pay 
higher dividends compensates investors for the subsequently harsher tax penalties placed 
on the dividend part of the total return. Dempsey (2001) however argued that Morgan 
and  Thomas’s  (1998)  findings  were  consistent with  a  rational  tax-based  explanation 
proposed by Elton and Gruber (1970) and Auerbach (1979) that was subsequently built 
upon by Lasfer (1995). Under this ‘classical’ approach it is shown there is an expected 
rational positive relationship between dividend yield and ex-day returns. 
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An  alternative  theory  to  explain  the  concentration  of  dividends  is  considered  by 
DeAngelo et al (2002). They point to previous work by Black and Scholes (1974) and 
Miller  (1977)  who  propose  that  the  number  of  firms  with  a  particular  set  of 
characteristics,  in  this case  dividends,  was  unimportant to  investors  as  long  as  their 
needs were met in aggregate. Hence the decline in dividend payers in the US was of no 
consequence so long as the remaining payers paid sufficient dividends. DeAngelo et al 
argue  that  given  the  increase  in  aggregate  dividends  combined  with  a  simultaneous 
decline in the number of payers, the latter was not caused by investors demanding fewer 
dividends. Instead some changes in dividend policy decisions made by firms caused the 
aggregate changes in dividends. 
 
Applying this logic to the UK findings in this study, there has been a significant increase 
in real dividends and hence there appears to have been no loss of appetite by investors 
for these payments; in fact the reverse appears to be true. Whilst there has been a decline 
in the number of payers over the period in question, around three-quarters of main listed 
industrials still paid dividends. Hence there have been changes in dividend decisions by 
UK industrials but these have not been as radical as the US. 
 
Dividends & Earnings 
 
This section considers the interaction that exists between dividends and earnings and 
looks  at  changes  that  have  occurred  between  1979  and  2000.  Before presenting  the 
results it should be noted that a limitation of the data in 1979 is that negative earnings 
are marked only as zero. Therefore, in many cases comparisons are made between only   22 
positive  earnings  since  this  is  applicable  to  both  epochs.  Where  possible  figures 
inclusive of negative earnings are also included for 2000. 
 
Table 8 shows the concentration of positive earnings amongst dividend payers using the 
same dividend ranking system as in Table 2. In 1979, it is clear that earnings were 
concentrated amongst the largest dividend payers with 68.3% of total positive earnings 
attributable to the largest 100 payers. The largest 300 payers account for 88.7% of the 
earnings. This is consistent with the previous findings of dividend concentration. 
 
In 2000, earnings have concentrated still further with the top 100 now accounting for 
85% of all earnings and the largest 300 over 96% of the total. As with dividends in 
2000, only the largest 100 payers show an increase in the proportion of total earnings 
compared with 1979. All the other groups have a lower percentage of the aggregate 
figure. The introduction of AIM firms makes little difference to the results since these 
firms have relatively small earnings, just as they had relatively small dividend payments. 
 
In  2000  the  real  positive  earnings  of  main  listed  industrials  had  increased  from 
£7,172.9m in 1979 to £17,353.9m. The real earnings of the largest 100 dividend payers 
were more than twice the total earnings of all industrials in 1979. The footnote to Table 
8 shows the effect of the inclusion of negative earnings in 2000. These reduce the total 
figures by around 4%, thus not affecting any conclusions too substantially. 
 
Comparing these results to those of DeAngelo et al (2002) it is noticeable that the UK 
results mirror the US evidence. The concentration of earnings once again is focussed on 
the largest 100 payers whilst the other groups decline in significance. There has also   23 
been an increase in total real earnings by industrials although this has been of a greater 
percentage than the US. 
 
Table 9 displays the percentages of earnings annually across the dividend classifications. 
These figures, whilst mirroring the dividend figures in the display of a concentration 
among the Top 100 payers and a decline in all other groups over time, were relatively 
unchanged for much of the sample period. For instance in 1981 the Top 100 accounted 
for  80.0%  of  all  positive  earnings  whilst  in  1999  this  was  80.3%.  This  is  another 
example of the snapshot method offering very different conclusions depending on the 
base years chosen. Over the whole period of 1979-2000 the Top 100’s share of total 
positive earnings rose from 68.3% to 85.1%. Thus, in reality, there was a sharp rise from 
1979-1981, a long period of relatively little change and finally another jump from 1999-
2000. It was anything but a linear increase between the beginning and end of the sample. 
 
Table 10 offers similarities with Table 9 but this time it is real amounts that are shown 
as opposed to percentages. The variability in earnings persists in real amounts as well as 
percentages. A peak in earnings of the Top 100, and indeed all industrials together, are 
reached in 1990 but these are not exceeded until 1996. The inference is that dividends 
are less cyclical than earnings. As such this makes the snapshot method less appropriate 
for analysing earnings than dividends. The use of an average measure such as the 5-year 
approach by DeAngelo et al (2002), appears to be a useful addition when comparing just 
two annual earnings periods. 
 
Table 11 exhibits the cross-sectional distribution of real earnings in 1979 and 2000; this 
includes both dividend payers and non-payers. The choice of category size is somewhat   24 
arbitrary but nonetheless provides a method of comparing two different periods of time. 
In  1979,  there  are  relatively  few  firms  in  the  large  earnings  categories,  only  24 
industrials earned £50m or greater. By far the largest group is those companies with 
earnings greater than zero but less than £10m; some 1063 firms inhabit this space or 
83% of all industrials. There were also relatively high numbers of observations of firms 
earning between £10m and £24.9m and firms with zero/negative earnings. Clearly most 
of the market in 1979 was comprised of relatively small firms. 
 
By 2000, there has been an increase in the number of industrials with large earnings. 
There  were  54  earning  £50m  or  greater.  A  considerable  decline  in  the  number  of 
industrials compared to 1979 was discovered in the lowest positive earnings category, 
although this remained the dominant category in terms of number of firms with 550. 
There was a virtual tripling of firms that posted zero/negative earnings in 2000. This was 
increased  still  further  when  AIM  stocks  were  introduced,  although  the  number  of 
positive  earners  increased  by  a  similar  amount.  The  proportion  of  firms  with 
zero/negative earnings is higher on AIM though compared to the main market, as one 
would expect from fledgling stocks. 
 
When the actual real earnings of each group are considered, the three firms in 1979 with 
earnings in excess of £250m accounted for 16.1%, or £1,157.7m, of total real positive 
earnings. The largest group, with 23% of total earnings, was those 1063 firms with 
earnings greater than zero but less than £10m. No category was particularly dominant 
overall though. By 2000 a different story emerges, the ten firms with earnings greater 
than £250m made up 50% of the total positive earnings. The firms with earnings greater 
than or equal to £100m accounted for 69% of the total. This lends further evidence to the   25 
conclusion that earnings have become more concentrated. The category of the lowest 
earners showed the greatest decline, accounting for just 7.2% of the total, or £1,313.3m, 
in 2000. 
 
A number of similarities occur between the UK evidence presented here and the US 
evidence  collected  by  DeAngelo  et  al  (2002).  The  high  proportion  of  firms  paying 
relatively small earnings, particularly in 1978/9, and the low number of firms in the 
largest categories accounting for a significant proportion of aggregate industrial earnings 
are particularly striking. In 2000, 26 firms were responsible for 63.4% of the total US 
industrial earnings. The proportion of total earnings in 1978 by the small earners was 
nowhere  near  as  large  as  in  the  UK  however.  Medium  to  large  earners  were  more 
significant in the US. An interesting discovery was the huge increase in US negative 
earnings in 2000 compared to 1978, from just 1.4% in the latter to 59.5% in the former. 
Whilst UK figures were unavailable in 1979, in 2000 negative earnings were only 11.7% 
of total positive earnings even after including the greater proportion of loss-making AIM 
stocks. 
 
Table 12 displays the number of firms in the various earnings categories across all years 
between 1979 and 2000. It could have been assumed from Table 11 that there was a 
linear increase in the number of firms with earnings between the first and last years of 
the sample. This has not been the case. There are distinct periods between 1981-82, 
1992-4  and  1999-00  where  there  have  been  dips  in  the  number  of  industrials  with 
positive earnings. These match up quite closely with the periods identified as recessions 
by Benito and Young (2001) and where there was an increase in the incidence of non-
paying firms.   26 
 
Table 13 uses the same earnings categories as Table 11 but distinguishes between payers 
of dividends and non-payers, and the proportions of earnings attributable to each. From 
Panel A, in 1979 it is clear that dividend payers dominate the earnings distribution. No 
industrial  that  earned  £10m  or  greater  failed  to  pay  a  dividend.  There  were  a  few 
incidences of non-payment amongst firms that had earned more than zero but less than 
£10m, but still 97.4% of this category paid dividends (Table 14 shows this was typical 
between  1979  and  2000).  The  non-payers  were  thus  clustered  mainly  in  the 
zero/negative earnings group where dividend payers made up just 39.7%. 
 
By 2000 there are incidences of non-payers further up the earnings scale but these are 
still very scarce. The non-payers remain concentrated in the low or negative earnings 
brackets and are a larger proportion compared to 1979. This is magnified further by the 
inclusion of AIM companies. 
 
Panel B shows the real amounts of earnings attributable to payers and non-payers. The 
earnings of non-payers in 1979 barely even register at a tiny 0.1%. In 2000, this figure is 
a little higher but still only around the 2% to 2.5% level of positive earnings. In terms of 
zero/negative earnings firms, the dividend payers make up a slightly larger percentage 
than is proportionate to the number of firms but non-payers are still responsible for at 
least 64% of negative earnings, and 70% when AIM is also included. 
 
A comparison of these results with those reported by DeAngelo et al (2002) finds in 
1978 US high earnings firms were all dividend payers, much like UK industrials in 
1979. However, there were more observations recorded of non-payers in the small to   27 
medium earnings firms in the US. Given that only around 65% of firms were payers 
compared to 94% in the UK this is probably as expected. By 2000 though there were 
non-payers in every earnings category and more than half of the firms earning less than 
£50m failed to pay a dividend. Clearly non-payment of dividends has been less of an 
issue for US investors than in the UK. In terms of total earnings, US non-payers were 
still  dwarfed  by  dividend  payers  in  1978  and  in  2000  non-payers  made  a  loss  in 
aggregate. The UK evidence was consistent with this. 
 
In  summary,  the  UK  evidence  points  to  a  concentration  of  earnings  amongst  large 
dividend  payers.  This  concentration  has  increased  between  1979  and  2000.  Lintner 
(1956)  found  that  earnings  were  the  primary  determinant  of  dividends  and  the 
concentration of both dividends and earnings together found in this study supports this. 
Given that more firms failed to pay dividends as more incidences of negative earnings 
were recorded, this further endorses Lintner’s conclusion. DeAngelo et al (1992) report 
that losses are an important factor in firms failing to pay dividends and again the UK 
results appear consistent with this view. Whilst  there  have  been  more firms posting 
negative earnings and also not paying dividends, the increase in dividends and earnings 
by high earners completely dominates this effect in aggregate. 
 
Listing and Dividend Status of Payers in 1979 
 
Table 15 shows dividend payers in 1979 and their dividend and listing status in 2000. 
Firms are ranked according to their dividend size in 1979 using the same classification 
as in Table 5. If the firms were still in existence at the end of 2000 they were classified 
as either dividend payers or non-payers. In cases where firms were no longer trading   28 
they were classified, using codes from the LSPD, as either delisted due to financial 
distress, delisted due to acquisition or delisted due to other reasons (see footnote to 
Table 15 for possible reasons). 
 
It is apparent that relatively few dividend payers in 1979 were still in existence in 2000. 
Only 25.6% of the sample survived, with 257 out of the 308 industrials continuing to 
pay dividends in 2000. Nearly all of the non-payers were firms that in 1979 paid less 
than  £1m.  Of  the  firms  that  were  not  trading  in  2000,  the  vast  majority  had  been 
acquired. Just 10.8% of industrial payers in 1979 delisted due to financial distress, whilst 
4.5% ceased trading for other reasons. Once more though, most of the firms that were 
not in existence in 2000 were small dividend payers, particularly those that were delisted 
due to financial distress. 
 
Towards the foot of Table 15 there are figures showing the proportion of dividends 
attributable to each category.  Although there were only  21.4% of  industrials paying 
dividends in both 1979 and 2000, they were large payers. These firms accounted for 
56.2% of all dividends in 1979 and 70.1% of total dividends in 2000. The payers in 1979 
but non-payers in 2000 made up just 1.2% of aggregate dividends in 1979. Similarly 
small  proportions  were  found  for  firms  delisted  due  to  distress  and  other  reasons. 
Acquired firms were significant payers at 38.8% of all dividends in 1979. 
 
The UK findings presented here are very similar to US evidence collected by DeAngelo 
et al (2002). Around one-fifth of US industrials paid dividends in both 1978 and 2000 
but  these  firms  accounted  for  62%  of  all  payments  in  1978  and  84.1%  in  2000. 
Delistings  due to  acquisitions accounted  for  57.4%  of  payers  in  1978  (compared  to   29 
59.1% of UK payers in 1979) and delistings due to financial distress were 11.0% (10.8% 
in UK findings). Again most of the firms lost from the sample were relatively small 
payers. 
 
As DeAngelo et al (2002) point out there is a considerable difference between delistings 
due to acquisitions and delistings due to financial distress in terms of the total industrial 
dividend  payment.  In  the  case  of  distress,  firms  are  lost  from  the  sample  and  their 
dividends  go  with  them.  This  is  not  necessarily  the  case  with  acquired  companies 
though.  In situations where a  dividend paying acquirer  purchases a  dividend paying 
industrial  using  its  own  shares,  the  number  of  shares  in  issue  will  rise  after  the 
acquisition is completed. Assuming the acquiring firm at least maintains the dividend 
per share then at worst a portion of the dividends ‘lost’ by the removal of the acquired 
firm will be ‘returned’ by the additional shares in issue by the acquiring firm. Thus 
acquisitions pose less of a threat to aggregate dividend payments than firms being lost 




Whilst there has been a decline in dividend paying firms in the UK between 1979 and 
2000,  the  total  dividends  paid  by  industrials  have  actually  increased.  Most  of  the 
dividend  payers  lost  from  the  market  have  been  relatively  small,  whilst  those  large 
payers have continued to grow their dividends, more than compensating for the effect of 
the former. This has lead to a greater concentration of dividends amongst relatively few 
firms. It was also found that earnings became more concentrated amongst those payers 
during the same period. This is consistent with Lintner (1956) who found earnings were   30 
the primary determinant of  dividends. Furthermore, all of  the findings about greater 
aggregate payments and an increased concentration of dividends and earnings support 
the  US  evidence  presented  by  DeAngelo  et  al  (2002).  Indeed  the  concentration  of 
dividends is found to be greater in the UK than in the US. 
 
The overall conclusions surrounding the dividend changes are not altered when annual 
data periods are used, however this analysis does provide additional information. It is 
particularly suited to more variable measures such as the number of dividend payers in a 
given year and total earnings. There was a long period during the sample when, if a 
snapshot approach had been used, it would have been possible to argue that dividend-
paying industrials, in number, were actually increasing. Changes in the concentration of 
dividends, by contrast, occurred very steadily with the minimum concentration in 1979 
and the maximum in 2000. The annual approach also showed an increased number of 
non-paying industrials was found around recessionary periods in the early 1980s and 
1990s consistent with Benito and Young (2001). 
 
When  the  listing  status  in  2000  of  dividend  payers  in  1979  was  analysed  it  was 
discovered that nearly 60% of 1979 payers had been acquired. This suggests that whilst 
numbers of payers declined there was the distinct possibility that many of the dividends 
remained, at least partially, as a result of new combined entities. Only 11% of 1979 
payers were lost to distress and just 4% moved to become non-payers in 2000. Overall, 
the  talk  of  the  demise  of  dividends  seems  premature.  31 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of Dividend Payments by Industrials in 1979 and 2000. 
 
  1979  2000 (Ex. AIM)  2000 (Inc. AIM) 
  Nominal  Nominal  % Change 
From 1979 
Nominal  % Change 
From 1979 
1. Number of 
Listed Industrials  1277  950  -25.6%  1196  -6.3% 
2. Number of 
Dividend Paying 
Industrials 
1202  707  -41.2%  800  -33.4% 
3. Proportion of 
Industrials Paying 
Dividends 
94.1%  74.2%  -19.9%  66.9%  -27.2% 
4. Total Nominal 








5. Total Real 
Dividends (£m, 
1979 base) 








6. Mean Real 
Dividend (£m, per 
dividend paying 
firm) 








7. Median Real 
Dividend (£m, per 
dividend paying 
firm) 








Notes: Firms must have been present in the database for at least one year before 
inclusion in the sample. Industrial firms exclude banks, insurance, property, other 
financials, investment trusts and utilities. 
Gross figures for 2000 are shown in brackets.  
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Table 2. Summary Statistics of Dividend Payments by Industrials between 1979 and 2000 (inclusive of USM and AIM). 
  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990 
No. of Div Paying 
Industrials  1202  1060  1085  1078  1128  1163  1210  1168  1191  1262  1266  1179 
Proportion of Div 
Paying Industrial  94.1%  84.3%  82.8%  80.8%  82.5%  84.3%  85.3%  85.6%  88.2%  90.0%  89.3%  85.0% 
Total Nominal Divs 
(£m)  3,539  3,902  4,215  4,475  5,055  6,112  7,443  9256  11,906  14,310  16,788  17,181 
Total Real Divs 
(1979 base, £m)  3,539  3,390  3,268  3,291  3,530  4,082  4,703  5,638  6,994  7,918  8,576  8,321 
Mean Real Div (per 
payer)  2.94  3.20  3.01  3.05  3.13  3.51  3.89  4.83  5.87  6.28  6.77  7.06 
Median Real Div (per 
payer)  0.42  0.46  0.53  0.37  0.35  0.37  0.38  0.44  0.54  0.59  0.68  0.64 
 








No. of Div Paying 
Industrials  1031  952  953  984  1041  1079  1127  1038  929  929  800  800 
Proportion of Div 
Paying Industrial  79.6%  77.1%  78.0%  80.3%  81.8%  80.8%  80.2%  75.3%  72.0%  72.0%  66.9%  66.9% 
Total Nominal Divs 
(£m)  19,127  18,661  18,443  20,369  23,041  25,253  27,289  24,239  23,366  25,919  23,794  26,429 
Total Real Divs 
(1979 base, £m)  8,553  8,136  7,887  8,466  9,278  9,925  10,350  8,947  8,476  9,402  8,385  9,314 
Mean Real Div (per 
payer)  8.30  8.55  8.28  8.60  8.91  9.20  9.18  8.62  9.12  10.12  10.48  11.64 
Median Real Div (per 
payer)  0.73  0.75  0.69  0.74  0.82  0.84  0.81  0.83  0.75  0.84  0.82  0.91  
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Percent of Total Dividends  Cumulative Percent of Total Dividends  Real Dividends (£m, 1979 base) 
  1979  2000 (ex. AIM)  2000 (inc. AIM)  1979  2000 (ex. AIM)  2000 (inc. AIM)  1979  2000 (ex. AIM)  2000 (inc. AIM) 
    Net  Gross  Net  Gross    Net  Gross  Net  Gross    Net  Gross  Net  Gross 
Top 100  72.8%  88.1%  88.1%  87.9%  87.9%  72.8%  88.1%  88.1%  87.9%  87.9%  2,576.5  7,371.2  8,188.9  7,371.2  8,188.9 
101-200  12.4%  6.6%  6.6%  6.6%  6.6%  85.2%  94.7%  94.7%  94.5%  94.5%  438.6  555.5  615.7  555.5  615.7 
201-300  5.2%  2.7%  2.7%  2.7%  2.7%  90.4%  97.4%  97.4%  97.2%  97.2%  185.6  229.8  255.2  229.9  255.3 
301-400  2.9%  1.4%  1.4%  1.4%  1.4%  93.3%  98.8%  98.8%  98.6%  98.6%  104.2  113.1  125.6  114.3  126.9 
401-500  1.9%  0.7%  0.7%  0.7%  0.7%  95.2%  99.5%  99.5%  99.3%  99.3%  67.2  59.9  66.5  61.6  68.3 
501-600  1.4%  0.4%  0.4%  0.4%  0.4%  96.6%  99.9%  99.9%  99.7%  99.7%  48.8  39.8  33.1  32.7  36.3 
601-700  1.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.2%  0.2%  97.7%  100.0%  100.0%  99.9%  99.9%  37.9  9.6  10.6  15.1  16.8 
701-800  0.8%  <0.1%  <0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  98.5%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  29.5  0.1  0.1  5.1  5.6 
801-900  0.6%          99.1%          21.4         
901-1000  0.4%          99.5%          15.1         
1001-1100  0.3%          99.8%          9.8         
1101-1200  0.1%          99.9%          4.4         
1201-1202  <0.1%          100.0%          <0.1         
Total  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  3,539.0  8,369.1  9,295.6  8,385.4  9,313.8 
No. of 
Firms       
         
   
1,202  707  707  800  800 
Notes: All dividend-paying industrials are ranked according to size of their total dividend payments. In the case of the group 701-800 in the year 2000 (ex. AIM) there are 
only 7 companies; there are exactly 800 companies in the year 2000 (inc. AIM).   
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1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Top 100  72.8%  75.4%  77.5%  78.1%  78.1%  77.8%  78.5%  79.7%  79.0%  78.5%  78.4% 
101-200  12.4%  11.8%  11.1%  11.2%  10.8%  11.0%  10.8%  10.4%  10.6%  10.7%  10.5% 
201-300  5.2%  4.8%  4.4%  4.2%  4.3%  4.3%  4.1%  3.9%  4.0%  3.9%  3.9% 
301-400  2.9%  2.6%  2.4%  2.3%  2.3%  2.4%  2.2%  2.1%  2.2%  2.3%  2.2% 
401-500  1.9%  1.8%  1.6%  1.5%  1.5%  1.4%  1.4%  1.3%  1.4%  1.4%  1.5% 
501-600  1.4%  1.3%  1.1%  1.1%  1.0%  1.0%  1.0%  0.9%  0.9%  1.0%  1.1% 
601-700  1.1%  0.9%  0.8%  0.7%  0.7%  0.8%  0.7%  0.6%  0.7%  0.7%  0.8% 
701-800  0.8%  0.6%  0.5%  0.5%  0.5%  0.5%  0.5%  0.4%  0.5%  0.5%  0.6% 
801-900  0.6%  0.4%  0.3%  0.3%  0.3%  0.4%  0.4%  0.3%  0.3%  0.4%  0.4% 
901-1000  0.4%  0.2%  0.2%  0.1%  0.2%  0.2%  0.3%  0.2%  0.2%  0.3%  0.3% 
1001-1100  0.3%  0.1%  0.0%  0.0%  0.1%  0.1%  0.2%  0.1%  0.1%  0.2%  0.2% 
1101-1200  0.1%        <0.1%  <0.1%  0.1%  <0.1%  <0.1%  0.1%  0.1% 
1201-1300  <0.1%            <0.1%      <0.1%  <0.1% 




1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Top 100  80.3%  82.3%  83.5%  83.7%  83.2%  83.0%  82.6%  81.7%  82.3%  85.4%  87.9% 
101-200  10.1%  9.5%  8.9%  8.7%  8.7%  8.4%  8.6%  9.1%  8.5%  7.6%  6.6% 
201-300  3.7%  3.4%  3.4%  3.4%  3.5%  3.4%  3.4%  3.6%  3.8%  3.2%  2.7% 
301-400  2.0%  1.9%  1.8%  1.8%  1.9%  1.9%  2.0%  2.1%  2.1%  1.7%  1.4% 
401-500  1.3%  1.1%  1.1%  1.0%  1.1%  1.2%  1.2%  1.3%  1.2%  1.0%  0.7% 
501-600  0.9%  0.7%  0.6%  0.6%  0.7%  0.8%  0.8%  0.8%  0.8%  0.6%  0.4% 
601-700  0.6%  0.5%  0.4%  0.4%  0.5%  0.5%  0.6%  0.6%  0.6%  0.3%  0.2% 
701-800  0.4%  0.3%  0.2%  0.2%  0.3%  0.4%  0.4%  0.4%  0.3%  0.2%  0.1% 
801-900  0.3%  0.2%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.2%  0.2%  0.3%  0.2%  0.1%   
901-1000  0.2%  0.1%  <0.1%  <0.1%  <0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  <0.1%   
1001-1100  0.1%  <0.1%        <0.1%  <0.1%  0.1%  <0.1%     
1101-1200  <0.1%              <0.1%       
Total  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
NB. Net figures only supplied for 1999 and 2000 since there is no appreciable difference in percentage terms when gross figures are used.  
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No. of Firms 
1979 
No. of Firms 2000 (ex. 
AIM) 





Real Dividends 2000 (ex. 
AIM, £m) 
Real Dividends 2000 (inc. 
AIM, £m) 
    Net  Gross  Net  Gross    Net  Gross  Net  Gross 
Greater than 
£100m 












































































































































































Figures in brackets indicate percentage change from 1979 values  
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Table 6. Number of Real Dividend Payments by Industrials between 1979 and 2000 (inclusive of USM and AIM). 
 
 
  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990 
Greater than £100m  3  3  2  3  4  4  4  7  10  12  12  13 
£50-£99.9m  7  6  7  7  7  6  12  11  15  18  22  20 
£40-£49.9m  3  3  4  1  3  6  4  8  9  8  11  9 
£30-£39.9m  7  3  4  4  4  8  8  8  18  20  21  19 
£20-£29.9m  10  13  12  13  16  18  24  26  25  26  23  27 
£10-£19.9m  46  48  46  46  42  43  42  44  44  47  49  45 
£5-£9.9m  58  51  46  45  44  48  49  49  46  52  53  46 
£1-£4.9m  221  196  183  176  188  204  218  231  275  296  328  283 
Less than £1m  847  737  781  783  820  826  849  784  749  783  747  717 
 
Total  1202  1060  1085  1078  1128  1163  1210  1168  1191  1262  1266  1179 
 








Greater than £100m  15  14  15  16  19  23  19  15  16  18  13  16 
£50-£99.9m  21  19  18  20  20  19  24  26  22  26  21  21 
£40-£49.9m  11  10  9  8  6  7  7  13  10  6  8  8 
£30-£39.9m  17  19  18  17  21  21  19  8  6  8  10  8 
£20-£29.9m  20  22  23  29  25  24  26  18  13  15  11  13 
£10-£19.9m  42  34  33  27  33  35  40  37  38  41  33  34 
£5-£9.9m  50  56  56  65  51  68  70  76  67  72  59  63 
£1-£4.9m  263  246  236  257  292  290  308  276  243  248  214  225 
Less than £1m  592  532  545  545  574  592  614  569  514  495  431  412 
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1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990 
Greater than £100m  733.5  779.3  636.9  748.7  858.9  1,040.1  1,190.3  1,858.4  2,533.3  3,092.1  3,365.1  3,393.4 
£50-£99.9m  421.0  369.8  454.6  446.5  441.1  420.2  801.0  780.9  979.7  1,143.3  1,403.4  1,293.3 
£40-£49.9m  128.2  131.1  176.8  44.8  137.0  273.7  168.9  358.7  414.5  344.9  469.6  409.5 
£30-£39.9m  230.1  98.9  132.8  141.4  139.4  278.7  277.8  272.3  611.7  692.8  717.8  681.2 
£20-£29.9m  220.6  306.2  273.8  304.0  369.6  420.1  589.6  659.8  617.9  657.8  567.5  679.2 
£10-£19.9m  640.6  660.8  644.4  672.0  612.8  616.5  606.2  604.8  615.0  676.4  690.0  645.7 
£5-£9.9m  404.5  368.2  332.3  321.7  316.7  339.5  360.5  367.5  351.3  378.3  369.9  321.3 
£1-£4.9m  486.1  430.7  389.6  389.9  426.7  455.3  467.3  503.5  623.7  658.4  715.5  642.3 
Less than £1m  274.2  244.6  226.6  222.4  227.9  237.6  240.9  232.6  247.3  273.5  277.1  254.7 
 












Greater than £100m  3,792.9  3,517.9  3,379.7  3,755.9  4,529.0  5,181.3  5,014.5  3,965.7  4,266.9  4,954.3  4,409.4  5,213.9 
£50-£99.9m  1,377.3  1,359.7  1,309.9  1,435.2  1,429.2  1,296.7  1,715.5  1,783.2  1,499.8  1,756.3  1,492.9  1,505.5 
£40-£49.9m  489.7  440.0  416.4  359.9  262.2  309.1  318.4  565.9  453.4  275.7  358.3  366.2 
£30-£39.9m  591.0  658.8  618.2  519.9  709.1  710.0  664.0  269.7  207.4  271.3  338.8  278.7 
£20-£29.9m  500.9  542.2  586.0  738.5  621.9  597.4  646.8  458.1  327.7  365.4  253.5  313.5 
£10-£19.9m  628.8  483.8  474.4  373.4  449.7  484.3  564.3  510.8  534.2  557.0  480.0  511.1 
£5-£9.9m  360.7  394.3  379.0  444.8  366.5  460.2  494.5  539.6  469.3  498.0  413.5  457.3 
£1-£4.9m  605.6  560.3  543.6  578.1  692.5  655.9  710.8  642.2  555.5  564.2  496.2  529.1 
Less than £1m  206.3  178.5  179.8  188.6  218.0  230.4  221.2  212.0  161.5  159.4  142.9  138.5 
 
Total  8,553.2  8,135.5  7,887.0  8,394.3  9,278.1  9,925.3  10,350.0  8,947.2  8,475.7  9,401.5  8,385.5 
 
9,313.8  
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Percent of Total Positive Earnings  Cumulative % of Total Positive 
Earnings 
Real Positive Earnings (£m, 1979 base) 












Top 100  68.3%  85.3%  85.1%  68.3%  85.3%  85.1%  4,898.2  14,815.6  14,815.6 
101-200  14.2%  8.0%  8.0%  82.5%  93.3%  93.1%  1,017.1  1,395.6  1,395.6 
201-300  6.2%  3.3%  3.3%  88.7%  96.6%  96.4%  448.6  575.1  574.5 
301-400  3.4%  1.5%  1.5%  92.1%  98.1%  97.9%  242.6  261.4  260.9 
401-500  2.2%  1.1%  1.1%  94.3%  99.2%  99.0%  155.7  184.8  184.0 
501-600  1.6%  0.5%  0.6%  95.9%  99.7%  99.6%  111.9  89.8  97.9 
601-700  1.4%  0.2%  0.3%  97.3%  99.9%  99.9%  98.8  31.1  52.7 
701-800  0.9%  <0.1%  0.1%  98.2%  100.0%  100.0%  68.4  0.5  20.1 
801-900  0.7%      98.9%      54.2     
901-1000  0.5%      99.4%      37.8     
1001-1100  0.4%      99.8%      25.8     
1101-1200  0.2%      100.0%      13.7     
1201-1269  <0.1%      100.0%      <0.1     
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  7172.9  17,353.9  17,401.3 
No. of Firms              1202  707  904 
Notes: All dividend-paying industrials are ranked according to size of their total dividend payments. In the case of the group 701-800 in the year 2000 (ex. AIM) 
there are only 7 companies; there are exactly 800 companies in the year 2000 (inc. AIM). 
If negative earnings are included then totals are £16,721.2m for 2000 (ex. AIM) and £16,762.2m for 2000 (inc. AIM). Negative earnings are unavailable for 1979.  
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Table 9. Percentages of Earnings by Dividend Paying Industrials between 1979 and 2000. 
 
  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Top 100  68.3%  78.0%  80.0%  79.5%  78.0%  77.9%  78.5%  78.8%  76.2%  75.0%  75.3% 
101-200  14.2%  10.2%  9.9%  10.1%  10.5%  9.9%  10.4%  10.3%  10.6%  12.1%  10.9% 
201-300  6.3%  4.4%  3.9%  3.9%  4.5%  4.6%  3.9%  4.1%  5.2%  4.3%  4.8% 
301-400  3.4%  2.4%  2.1%  2.3%  2.5%  2.7%  2.4%  2.5%  2.9%  2.8%  2.5% 
401-500  2.2%  1.6%  1.5%  1.6%  1.6%  1.5%  1.5%  1.4%  1.7%  1.8%  1.9% 
501-600  1.6%  1.2%  0.9%  1.0%  1.0%  1.1%  1.1%  1.0%  1.1%  1.2%  1.4% 
601-700  1.4%  0.9%  0.7%  0.6%  0.7%  0.8%  0.7%  0.7%  0.7%  1.0%  1.0% 
701-800  1.0%  0.6%  0.5%  0.4%  0.5%  0.6%  0.5%  0.5%  0.6%  0.6%  0.8% 
801-900  0.8%  0.4%  0.3%  0.3%  0.3%  0.4%  0.4%  0.4%  0.4%  0.5%  0.5% 
901-1000  0.5%  0.2%  0.2%  0.1%  0.2%  0.3%  0.2%  0.2%  0.3%  0.3%  0.4% 
1001-1100  0.4%  0.1%  <0.1%  <0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.2%  0.1%  0.2%  0.3%  0.3% 
1101-1200  0.2%        0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  <0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.2% 
1201-1300  <0.1%            <0.1%      <0.1%  <0.1% 
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
  
  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Top 100  78.1%  81.0%  81.7%  80.8%  80.5%  78.8%  78.5%  78.5%  78.4%  80.3%  85.1% 
101-200  10.5%  9.6%  8.8%  9.3%  9.5%  10.3%  9.8%  9.7%  9.8%  9.7%  8.0% 
201-300  4.3%  3.7%  4.0%  4.1%  4.3%  4.1%  4.2%  4.1%  4.9%  4.0%  3.3% 
301-400  2.5%  2.2%  2.3%  2.5%  2.3%  2.6%  2.4%  2.6%  2.5%  2.6%  1.5% 
401-500  1.5%  1.4%  1.4%  1.3%  1.3%  1.5%  1.4%  1.5%  1.5%  1.4%  1.1% 
501-600  1.0%  0.8%  0.7%  1.0%  0.9%  1.0%  1.0%  1.1%  1.1%  0.9%  0.6% 
601-700  0.8%  0.5%  0.5%  0.5%  0.6%  0.8%  0.8%  0.8%  0.8%  0.6%  0.3% 
701-800  0.5%  0.4%  0.3%  0.3%  0.4%  0.5%  0.7%  0.5%  0.5%  0.3%  0.1% 
801-900  0.4%  0.2%  0.2%  0.2%  0.2%  0.3%  0.3%  0.3%  0.3%  0.2%   
901-1000  0.3%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.2%  0.2%  0.6%  0.2%  <0.1%   
1001-1100  0.1%  <0.1%        <0.1%  0.5%  0.2%  <0.1%     
1101-1200  <0.1%            0.1%  <0.1%       
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  
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Table 10. Real Amounts of Earnings by Dividend Paying Industrials between 1979 and 2000 (inclusive of USM and AIM, 1979 £s). 
 
  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Top 100  4,898.2  6,545.9  5,210.3  4,862.7  4,813.5  6,003.4  7,421.5  8,243.7  9,517.9  10,538.5  10,829.2 
101-200  1,017.1  857.8  643.7  620.4  647.7  762.8  981.7  1,075.6  1,323.2  1,697.7  1,570.7 
201-300  448.6  373.3  253.9  238.4  277.6  357.7  372.0  433.8  644.5  602.7  689.2 
301-400  242.6  200.7  139.1  143.4  156.0  206.7  229.4  257.8  368.2  388.6  361.2 
401-500  155.7  132.7  94.7  96.8  95.7  114.6  140.2  151.2  211.6  251.7  277.0 
501-600  111.9  98.2  60.1  60.3  62.9  87.4  103.5  103.1  138.9  166.9  199.6 
601-700  98.8  75.5  47.7  38.4  41.5  60.9  65.8  72.2  90.2  134.7  147.8 
701-800  68.4  52.8  32.0  26.6  32.0  47.9  51.5  47.4  77.9  91.3  110.4 
801-900  54.2  32.0  17.9  16.0  21.3  29.1  37.3  37.5  52.2  67.8  67.3 
901-1000  37.8  20.5  13.2  8.4  14.6  23.6  23.6  25.9  33.0  46.7  59.0 
1001-1100  25.8  4.2  3.1  2.3  4.8  11.4  16.4  13.5  20.3  35.9  49.4 
1101-1200  13.7        3.2  4.6  6.8  3.5  6.3  20.1  22.9 
1201-1300  <0.1            0.1      5.5  5.8 
Total  7,172.90  8,393.60  6,515.70  6,113.70  6,170.80  7,710.10  9,449.80  10,465.20  12,484.20  14,048.10  14,389.50 
  
  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Top 100  11,622.3  10,956.2  9,156.4  8,628.9  10,054.5  10,781.3  11,886.7  12,798.8  12,487.4  12,079.8  14,815.6 
101-200  1,556.9  1,303.5  988.2  992.3  1,183.0  1,403.2  1,483.3  1,584.9  1,567.2  1,457.7  1,395.6 
201-300  637.6  500.3  451.2  436.1  536.5  554.8  633.9  676.4  786.4  604.3  574.5 
301-400  368.3  298.9  253.7  264.3  289.9  348.9  370.8  424.7  393.7  397.0  260.9 
401-500  221.3  183.1  156.1  137.6  162.9  199.9  216.3  237.2  241.7  211.7  184.0 
501-600  154.0  113.9  81.9  102.1  110.2  140.7  158.2  182.6  175.6  137.5  97.9 
601-700  115.7  73.9  53.9  56.1  76.4  107.1  117.0  124.8  120.6  85.9  52.7 
701-800  73.9  50.5  28.4  28.9  44.5  70.3  111.0  85.5  75.7  46.7  20.1 
801-900  52.2  27.6  22.0  19.1  24.3  42.9  48.9  57.0  45.6  23.8   
901-1000  45.0  18.3  9.5  10.2  9.1  23.6  28.7  104.9  26.9  3.1   
1001-1100  22.2  1.9        2.8  81.3  35.9  6.0     
1101-1200  6.4            9.3  1.8       
Total  14,875.80  13,528.10  11,201.30  10,675.60  12,491.30  13,675.50  15,145.40  16,314.50  15,926.80  15,047.50  17,401.30  
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Table 11. Cross-Sectional Distribution of Industrials Real Earnings in 1979 and 2000 
 
Number of Firms  Real Earnings (£m, 1979 base)  Real Earnings as % of Total Positive Real 
Earnings  Real 
Earnings 
(1979 base)  1979  2000 (ex. 
AIM) 
2000 (inc. 
AIM)  1979  2000 (ex. 
AIM) 
2000 (inc. 





£250m  3  10  10  1,157.7  8,916.6  8,916.6  16.1%  50.0%  49.8% 
£100m to 
£249.9m  4  22  22  629.5  3,438.2  3,438.2  8.8%  19.3%  19.2% 
£75m to 
£99.9m  8  10  10  708.8  895.1  895.1  9.9%  5.0%  5.0% 
£50m to 
£74.9m  9  12  12  556.6  721.3  721.3  7.7%  4.0%  4.0% 
£25m to 
£49.9m  36  45  45  1,226.9  1,542.4  1,542.4  17.1%  8.7%  8.6% 
£10m to 
£24.9m  76  65  66  1,233.4  989.8  1,010.6  17.2%  5.6%  5.6% 
>£0m to 
£9.9m  1063  550  672  1,669.9  1,313.3  1,371.3  23.2%  7.4%  7.7% 
Zero or 
Negative  78  239  359  N/A  -1,752.5  -2,091.1  N/A  -9.8%  -11.7% 
Total Pos. 
Earnings  1199  714  837  7,182.9  17,816.8  17,895.6  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Total All 
Earnings  1277  953  1196  N/A  16,064.3  15,804.4  N/A  90.2%  88.3%  
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1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Greater than £250m  3  3  2  4  4  5  4  7  7  8  10 
£100m to £249.9m  4  5  4  3  3  4  9  11  13  14  15 
£75m to £99.9m  8  5  3  4  7  9  8  3  12  17  15 
£50m to £74.9m  9  13  12  12  11  17  16  20  24  27  26 
£25m to £49.9m  36  32  26  30  28  24  39  44  46  43  36 
£10m to £24.9m  76  70  58  54  52  60  64  62  69  79  87 
>£0m to £9.9m  1063  909  839  860  925  1060  1052  1022  994  1078  1086 
Zero or Negative  78  221  367  367  337  200  227  196  186  137  142 
Total Pos. Earns  1199  1037  944  967  1030  1179  1192  1169  1165  1266  1275 




1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Greater than £250m  12  10  7  7  9  11  11  11  8  11  10 
£100m to £249.9m  14  18  20  16  23  18  22  29  28  20  22 
£75m to £99.9m  20  15  5  11  9  14  13  7  12  11  10 
£50m to £74.9m  23  15  15  15  14  14  14  13  20  15  12 
£25m to £49.9m  39  41  34  33  37  38  42  48  38  40  45 
£10m to £24.9m  78  67  61  51  69  75  74  77  86  77  66 
>£0m to £9.9m  1004  867  773  754  800  865  898  952  879  766  672 
Zero or Negative  197  262  320  335  264  238  261  268  308  350  359 
Total Pos. Earns  1190  1033  915  887  961  1035  1074  1137  1071  940  837 
Total All Earnings  1387  1295  1235  1222  1225  1273  1335  1405  1379  1290  1196 
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Table 13A. Proportions of Real Earnings Distributed between Dividend Payers and Non-Payers in 1979 and 2000 
1979  2000 (ex. AIM)  2000 (inc. AIM)  Real Earnings (1979 
base)  Payers  Non 
Payers 
% Payers  Payers  Non 
Payers 
% Payers  Payers  Non 
Payers 
% Payers 
Greater than £250m  3  0  100.0%  10  0  100.0%  10  0  100.0% 
£100m to £249.9m  4  0  100.0%  21  1  95.5%  21  1  95.5% 
£75m to £99.9m  8  0  100.0%  9  1  90.0%  9  1  90.0% 
£50m to £74.9m  9  0  100.0%  12  0  100.0%  12  0  100.0% 
£25m to £49.9m  36  0  100.0%  45  0  100.0%  45  0  100.0% 
£10m to £24.9m  76  0  100.0%  63  2  96.9%  63  3  95.5% 
>£0m to £9.9m  1035  28  97.4%  478  72  86.9%  559  113  83.2% 
Zero or Negative  31  47  39.7%  69  170  28.9%  81  278  22.6% 
Total  1202  75  94.1%  707  246  74.2%  800  396  66.9% 
 
Table 13B. Real Earnings Distributed between Dividend Payers and Non-Payers in 1979 and 2000 
1979  2000 (ex. AIM)  2000 (inc. AIM)  Real Earnings (1979 
base)  Payers  Non 
Payers 
% Payers  Payers  Non 
Payers 
% Payers  Payers  Non 
Payers 
% Payers 
Greater than £250m  1,157.7  0  100.0%  8,916.6  0  100.0%  8,916.6  0  100.0% 
£100m to £249.9m  629.5  0  100.0%  3,189.2  249.0  92.8%  3,189.2  249.0  92.8% 
£75m to £99.9m  708.8  0  100.0%  814.4  80.8  91.0%  814.4  80.8  91.0% 
£50m to £74.9m  556.6  0  100.0%  721.3  0  100.0%  721.3  0  100.0% 
£25m to £49.9m  1,226.9  0  100.0%  1,542.4  0  100.0%  1,542.4  0  100.0% 
£10m to £24.9m  1,233.4  0  100.0%  957.2  32.6  96.7%  957.2  53.4  94.7% 
>£0m to £9.9m  1,669.8  10.0  99.4%  1,212.8  100.5  92.3%  1,260.2  111.1  91.9% 
Zero or Negative  N/A  N/A  N/A  -632.7  -1,111.9  36.1%  -639.1  -1,452.0  30.6% 
Total  N/A  N/A  N/A  16,720.6  -656.9  104.1%  16,762.2  -957.7  106.1% 
Total Positive Earn.  7,182.9  10.0  99.9%  17,353.9  462.9  97.4%  17,401.3  494.3  97.2%  
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1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Greater than £250m  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
£100m to £249.9m  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
£75m to £99.9m  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
£50m to £74.9m  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
£25m to £49.9m  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
£10m to £24.9m  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  98.3%  100.0%  98.4%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
>£0m to £9.9m  97.4%  94.1%  94.8%  94.0%  94.9%  92.3%  94.0%  93.0%  95.2%  95.0%  94.0% 
Zero or Negative  39.7%  34.8%  50.4%  44.4%  43.0%  33.5%  35.7%  36.7%  39.8%  36.5%  39.4% 
Total Pos. Earns  97.7%  94.8%  95.3%  94.6%  95.4%  93.0%  94.7%  93.8%  95.9%  95.7%  94.9% 




1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Greater than £250m  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  88.9%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
£100m to £249.9m  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  96.4%  100.0%  95.5% 
£75m to £99.9m  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  90.0% 
£50m to £74.9m  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  92.9%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
£25m to £49.9m  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  93.9%  97.3%  97.4%  97.6%  100.0%  100.0%  97.5%  100.0% 
£10m to £24.9m  97.4%  97.0%  96.7%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  98.7%  100.0%  98.7%  95.5% 
>£0m to £9.9m  92.2%  91.5%  92.5%  92.6%  91.8%  92.5%  92.5%  91.8%  90.0%  87.5%  83.2% 
Zero or Negative  35.0%  28.2%  30.3%  37.0%  34.5%  30.7%  28.0%  25.7%  18.2%  24.9%  22.6% 
Total Pos. Earns  93.3%  92.6%  93.4%  93.5%  92.9%  93.5%  93.7%  93.1%  91.7%  89.6%  85.9% 
Total All Earnings  85.0%  79.6%  77.1%  78.0%  80.3%  81.8%  80.8%  80.2%  75.3%  72.0%  66.9%  
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Table 15. Listing and Dividend Status of Industrial Dividend Payers in 1979 
 
Real Dividend 
Payment (1979 £’s) 
All Dividend 
Payers in 1979 
Paid Dividends in 
2000 
Listed Non-
Payers in 2000 
Delisted due to 
Financial Distress 
Delisted due to 
Acquisition 
Delisted due to 
Other Reasons* 
Greater than £100m  3  3  0  0  0  0 
£50-£99.9m  7  4  0  0  3  0 
£40-£49.9m  3  2  0  0  1  0 
£30-£39.9m  7  5  0  0  1  1 
£20-£29.9m  10  6  1  0  3  0 
£10-£19.9m  46  22  0  0  23  1 
£5-£9.9m  58  22  2  1  33  0 
£1-£4.9m  221  51  1  14  149  6 
Less than £1m  847  142  47  115  497  46 
 
Total No. of Firms 













Total 1979 Divs. 













Total 2000 Real 
Dividends 




(70.1%)         
* Other reasons included voluntary liquidation where value remained for shareholders, change of listing to a foreign country, enfranchisement and quotation 
cancellation/suspension for unknown reasons. 
 